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[A] government that is comparatively inactive but does the wrong things
may do much more to cripple the forces of a market economy than one
that is more concerned with economic affairs but confines itself to actions
which assist the spontaneousforces of the economy.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Vertical price fixing involves an agreement between parties at different
levels of the product distribution chain to set, maintain, stabilize, raise or
depress the price of goods or services within the intrabrand market.2 Until
1. F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 222 (1960).
2. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 342-51 (1982) (agreements to fix minimum or maximum price are illegal per se); United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) (agreements to fix price are found in any market manipulation which artificially stimulates price). A combination whose effect is the "raising, depressing, fixing, pegging or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce"
is illegal and in violation of the Sherman Act. See id. (agreements affecting price are illegal per
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recently, courts found price oriented vertical restraints illegal per se.3 In the
Sherman Antitrust Act4 (the Sherman Act), Congress made clear that an
explicit agreement to fix prices at any level, or an agreement which has the
ultimate effect of fixing prices at any level, is illegal per se.5
After 1911, courts applied the rule of per se illegality to vertical restraints
which directly affected price, or interfered with the natural market forces
which proximately affected prices. 6 However, in 1983, the Department of

se). See generally Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court. An analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 282, 291-92 (1975) (maximum vertical price restraints are illegal per se).
3. See Nat'l Soc'y of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978)
(restraints which have anticompetitive impact on price are illegal per se); see also Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979) (restraints which are
detrimental to competition are illegal per se); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
433 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1977) (market restraints which affect price are illegal per se); United States
v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 147 (1966) (conspiracies to eliminate discount retailers
have indirect affect on price and is illegal per se); United States v. Frankfort Distilleries Inc.,
324 U.S. 293, 296 (1945) (price fixing is illegal under Sherman Act); United States v. Masonite
Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 276 (1941) (fixing prices by one member of group pursuant to express
delegation, acquiescence or understanding of others is illegal per se); Fashion Originator's
Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 466 (1941) (vertical price fixing tends to create monopolies
and lessen competition and is illegal); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,
223 (1940) (vertical price fixing is illegal per se); FTC v. Pacific States Paper Trade Ass'n, 273
U.S. 52, 62 (1927) (express or tacit agreement on price is illegal); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373, 399-402 (1911) (agreements or combinations between
dealers which have purpose of destruction of competition are illegal per se). See generally
Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution,
HorizontalMerger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282, 290 (1975)
(vertical price restraints are illegal per se).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act provides that: "[e]very
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal."
Id.
5. See Maricopa County MedicalSoc'y, 457 U.S. at 342-51 (agreements which affect either
minimum or maximum prices are illegal under Sherman Act); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) (any agreements which stimulate movement in market
prices are illegal per se). Any agreement which has the purpose or effect of "raising, depressing, fixing, pegging or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce"
is a violation of the Sherman Act. Id.
6. See National Soc'y of Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. at 688 (restraints which have
impact on prices are illegal per se); Broadcast Music, Inc.,, 441 U.S. at 19-20 (per se rule
applies to restraints which stifle competition); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
433 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1977) (restraints with market impact on price are illegal per se); General
Motors Corp., 384 U.S. at 147 (conspiracies which have indirect effect on price are illegal per
se); Frankfort DistilleriesInc., 324 U.S. at 296 (price fixing is illegal under Sherman Act eeen
though affecting only local prices); Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. at 276 (agreements which fix
prices by express delegation, acquiescence or understanding of others is illegal per se); United
States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 251 (1942) (fact that item has patent is no excuse for
vertical price restraints); Fashion Originator'sGuild of America, Inc., 312 U.S. at 466 (vertical
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Justice 7 sought to foster an alternative to the per se rule by actively arguing,
before the United States Supreme Court, the merits of an antitrust policy
founded on a theory originally formulated by the Chicago School of Economics. 8 The Court first responded to the Justice Department's arguments
in 1984 by increasing the evidentiary burden on plaintiffs in vertical price
fixing litigation. 9 Then in 1989, the Court, in Business Electronics Corp. v.
Sharp Electronics Corp.,' ° abandoned the per se rule against vertical price
fixing by holding that an agreement between a manufacturer and a non-discount retailer to terminate the product supply sold to a discount retailer was
not per se illegal under the Sherman Act. " While prior caselaw established

price fixing is illegal); Socony- Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 223 (vertical price fixing is illegal
per se); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 396 (1927) (reasonableness of
price is no excuse); Pacific States Paper Trade, 273 U.S. at 62 (express or tacit agreement on
price is illegal); Dr. Miles Medical Co., 220 U.S. at 399-401 (agreements or combinations between dealers which have purpose of destruction of competition are illegal per se). See generally Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution,
Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282, 290 (1975)
(vertical price restraints are illegal per se); Bork, The Rule of Reason and The Per Se Concept:
Price Fixing and Market Division, 75 YALE L. J. 373, 397-494 (1966) (agreements which affect
price are illegal per se).
7. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioner, Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (No. 82-914) (Justice Department
is enforcer of antitrust laws). It is clear that it is the responsibility of the Department of
Justice to enforce the antitrust laws through the initiation of suits upon the public interest to
promote competition in the marketplace. Id. at 15-18. "The United States has the primary
responsibility for the enforcement of the federal antitrust laws, [and] has a substantial interest
in assuring that the Sherman Act is construed in a manner that most effectively advances the
Act's objective of protecting the Nation's competitive economic system." Id. at 18.
8. See Monsanto v. Spray-Rite Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984) (plaintiff must prove that
agreement exists as well as disprove all possible defenses). The Justice Department espoused a
theory of antitrust developed by Judges Robert Bork and Richard Posner, often considered the
leaders of the Chicago School. See Report by House Committee on the Judiciary on the Price
Fixing Prevention Act of 1989, Trade Regulation Reports (CCH) No. 438, at 4 (April 11,
1990). Under the influence of the Chicago School theory, the Court altered the evidentiary
burden placed upon plaintiffs in vertical price fixing actions. Id. at 2. The Court determined
that in order to recover in a vertical price fixing action, the plaintiff need prove that there was
an agreement as well as disprove all possible justifications for the vertical restraint imposed by
the manufacturer. Id.; see also Monsanto, 464 U.S. at 764.
9. See Monsanto, 464 U.S. at 764. The plaintiff must prove that an agreement exists as
well as disprove all possible defenses. Id. While the Court chose to alter the plaintiffs evidentiary burden in vertical price fixing suits, the Court explicitly stated that it would not extend its
inquiry into the propriety of the per se prohibition of vertical price fixing as requested by the
Justice Department. Id. at 752 n.7.
10. 485 U.S. 717, 736 (1988) (Court revised per se rule). The Court abandoned the rule
that all agreements which affect price are illegal per se and instead fashioned the rule that only
agreements which explicitly fix prices are illegal per se. Id.
11. 485 U.S. 717, 731-35 (1988) (Court determined that vertical restraints that do not
explicitly state price are to be judged under Rule of Reason rather than per se prohibition).
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that agreements which explicitly state price, and those which merely affect
price, are illegal per se, the Sharp decision stated that only agreements which
explicitly fix prices are illegal per se. 12 The Sharp decision directly contradicts 80 years of precedent which held that agreements which either explicitly set or implicitly affect prices were illegal per se. 13
II.

THE ORIGIN OF THE PER SE RULE AGAINST
VERTICAL PRICE FIXING

In the late nineteenth century, Congress first asserted its role as the "ultimate antitrust policymaker."' 4 Because of problems created by the Industrial Revolution,' 5 Congress perceived the need to create legislation which
would temper the anticompetitive trusts that had formed in the wake of
rapid economic growth. 16 In a process known as vertical integration, manu12. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) (agreements
to fix price found in any market manipulation which artificially stimulates price). A combination whose effect is the "raising, depressing, fixing, pegging or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce" is illegal and in violation of the Sherman Act. Id.
Contra Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 730-31 (1988)
(Court determined that vertical restraints that simply effect price are to be judged under Rule
of Reason rather than per se prohibition).
13. See Business Electronic Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 730-31
(1988) (vertical price fixing not illegal per se unless explicit agreement on price). Contra Dr.
Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373, 399-402 (1911) (agreements which
explicitly fix or implicitly affect prices are illegal per se).
14. See Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Abbott Labs, 460 U.S. 150, 170 (1983)
(quoting in part United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 606 (1941)) (Congress is ultimate
antitrust policy-maker). In commenting on the controversy over the propriety of previous
antitrust legislation, the Court stated that: "[a]lthough Congress is well aware of these criticisms... it certainly is not for [this Court] to indulge in the business of policy-making in the
field of antitrust legislation .... Our function ends with the endeavor to ascertain from the
words used, construed in the light of the relevant material, what was in fact the intent of
Congress." Id. This deference by the judiciary to the legislative branch in the field of antitrust
policy has come under attack by the Chicago School. See generally Posner, Statutory Interpretation in the Classroom and the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 818 (1983) (Congressional
intent is subservient to common law). Judge Posner stated that: "[i]f the legislature enacts
into statutory law a common law concept, as Congress did when it forbade agreements in
'restraints of trade' in the Sherman Act, that is a clue that the courts are to interpret the
statute with the freedom with which they would construe and apply a common law principlein which event the values of the framers may not be controlling after all." Id.
15. See J. HUGHES, AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY 233 (1987) (history of Industrial
Revolution and economic age); S. MORRISON, H. COMMAGER & W. LEUCHTENBERG, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 371 (1983) (history of Industrial Revolution).
The era from 1870-1920 can truly be called the Industrial Revolution. Id.
16. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988) (contracts, combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade
are illegal); 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988) (agreements or attempts to monopolize are illegal). Section I
of the Sherman Antitrust Act provides that: "[elvery contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
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facturers had absorbed multiple levels of the production process.' 7 Vertical
integration takes place when a manufacturer acquires the means of distributing and/or retailing its own product.1 8 In so doing, manufacturers narrow
or even eliminate competition among retail dealers of their products, known
as intrabrand competition,9 in an attempt to promote the competitiveness of
their products in the market of comparable goods, which is known as interbrand competition. 2" To effectuate this integration, manufacturers imposed
non-price vertical restraints, such as territorial 21 or customer assignments, 22

with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal." Id. Furthermore "[e]very person who
shall monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce" is acting in violation of the law. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
17. See S. MORRISON, & H. COMMAGER, & W. LEUCHTENBERG, A CONCISE HISTORY
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 371 (1983) (history of Industrial Revolution). Large corporations, known as trusts, sought to expand their operations and capture the resources of the
production of their goods. Id. By allocating resources to purchase all elements of the production process of their own goods these trusts had vertically integrated. Id. Further, these trusts
sought to horizontally integrate by entering into agreements with their competitors to fix
prices and stifle competition. See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 396401 (1927) (all horizontal price fixing agreements are illegal per se).
18. See generally R. POSNER, ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES AND OTHER
MATERIALS 133-35 (1974) (nature of vertical restraints).
19. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 (1977) (intrabrand
competition is among retailers of same name brand product); see also Business Electronics
Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 725-27 (1988) (intrabrand competition is not
prime concern of antitrust legislation). See generally Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust
Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 18-22 (1981)
(discussion of merits and disadvantages of balancing test between interbrand and intrabrand
competition). Competition in the marketplace is the sum of various factors, the propriety of
which cannot be properly addressed through a balancing test. Id. Instead, the merits of restricted distribution arrangements need be determined by a statistical analysis of the market
situation to see if such an arrangement has procompetitive affects and results in greater economic efficiency. Id. at 21-22.
20. See Continental TV.., Inc., 433 U.S. at 52 n.19 (interbrand competition is among
retailers of same product manufactured by different companies); Business Electronics Corp.,
485 U.S. at 725-28 (interbrand competition is prime concern of antitrust legislation), Northern
Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (goal of antitrust laws is to stimulate
interbrand competition).
21. See Continental T V. Inc., 433 U.S. at 52-54 (non-price vertical restraints, such as
territorial restraints, legal under Rule of Reason); United States v. White Motor Co., 372 U.S.
253, 258-61 (1963) (vertical allocation of dealer territory legal under Rule of Reason); Packard
Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418, 420-21 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (exclusive
dealerships are legal under Rule of Reason so long as does not create monopoly). See generally
Bork, The Rule of Reason and The Per Se Concept. PriceFixing and Market Division, 75 YALE
L.J. 373, 402-04 (1966) (geographic market division is governed by Rule of Reason).
22. See United States V. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610-12 (1972) (attempt to
divide customer market is attempt to monopolize which is illegal per se); Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 264-68 (1899) (any agreement between businesses
performing similar services or dealing in similar products to divide up the market place is
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as well23as price based vertical restraints,24 which entailed the assigning of minimum and maximum vertical prices.
In 1890, Congress responded to the growing problem of vertical price fixing by passing the Sherman Act, which became the wellspring of subsequent
antitrust policy. 2" The framers of the Sherman Act clearly intended "to protect competition not competitors.", 26 The Sherman Act provided that
"[e]very contract, . . . combination .
or conspiracy in restraint of trade,
...is declared to be illegal ....
The Supreme Court first applied this language to vertical price fixing in
the landmark case of Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John Park & Sons Co..28 In
Dr. Miles, a manufacturer of medicines sought to protect its unpatented
formula by expressly requiring its wholesalers and subsequent retailers to
adhere to a mandatory minimum price. 29 A group of discount chemists filed
suit alleging that the contract violated the Sherman Act because it restrained
trade by prohibiting wholesalers from selling to the discount chemist.3 ° The
Supreme Court, construing the Sherman Act, determined that contracts,
combinations and conspiracies to set minimum price levels were illegal per
se, and thus nullified the Dr. Miles contract.3 The Court found that once
the manufacturer parts with his goods by selling them to a wholesaler, disillegal per se). See generally Bork, The Rule of Reason and The Per Se Concept.- Price Fixing
and Market Division, 75 YALE L. J. 373, 403-04 (1966) (agreements which divide market tend
to create monopolies and are illegal per se).
23. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373, 407-09 (1911)
(agreements which fix minimum vertical prices are illegal per se). See generally Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal
Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282, 290 (1975) (minimum
vertical price restraints are illegal per se).
24. See Albrecht v. The Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 151-53 (1968) (termination of dealer
for charging in excess of maximum price restraint was illegal per se); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 214 (1951) (agreement among competitors setting
maximum vertical price is illegal per se). See generally Posner, Antitrust Policy and the
Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution,Horizontal Merger and Potential
Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282, 289-90 (1975) (maximum vertical price restraints are illegal per se).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
26. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act provides that: "[e]very
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."
28. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
29. Id. at 374-76. The manufacturer of a secret but unpatented formula sought to protect
its investment by instituting a contractual arrangement to fix retail prices. Id.
30. Id. at 381-83. A group of chemists who had been charging less than the price mandated by the manufacturer brought suit alleging that the contractual provision was in violation
of the Sherman Act. Id.
31. Id. at 408-09.
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tributor, or retailer, it may not restrict future competition at other levels of

the distribution chain by requiring continued compliance with a minimum
price restraint.3 2
Forty years later, in Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
Inc.," the Supreme Court applied the per se rule to invalidate maximum
price restraints.34 In Kiefer-Stewart, a wholesaler brought an action against
his supplier for illegally fixing maximum retail prices.35 The Court held that
agreements which set a maximum price are also illegal per se. 36 The Court
concluded that Congress intended through the Sherman Act to declare all
price-fixing, maximum or minimum, as inimical to a free market because it
cripples natural market forces by inhibiting the capacity of competitors to
establish prices based upon their own economic judgment. 37 In the Dr.
Miles and Kiefer-Stewart decisions, the Supreme Court interpreted the intent
of the Sherman Act to demand the legal nullification of agreements which fix
maximum or minimum prices.38
The rule stating that vertical price fixing is illegal per se became a pillar of
antitrust jurisprudence. 39 This rule rested upon the Sherman Act's require-

32. Id. at 405. After they are sold, a manufacturer has no control over the goods he
manufactures. Id. It is illegal for the manufacturer to assert control over the price of a good
once sold because to do so is to restrict competition at lower levels of the chain of distribution.
Id.
33. 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
34. Id. at 213-14. Maximum price fixing is just as inimical to a free market economy as is
minimum price fixing. Id.
35. Id. at 212-13. In Kiefer-Stewart, the Court allowed a price fixing wholesaler to recover damages from a price fixing supplier. Id. at 215.
36. Id. at 213-14. The Court reasoned that even though the competitors were free to
charge whatever price they wished below the maximum price, the presence of a maximum
price restraint acted to artificially establish prices and distort the allocation of resources in the
marketplace. Id. at 212-13. Therefore, a price fixing agreement which tends to establish maximum prices is illegal per se under the Sherman Act. Id. at 215. See generally Posner, Antitrust
Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger
and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282, 288-90 (1975) (vertical price
restraints which set maximum price levels are illegal per se).
37. See Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951) (agreement among competitors setting maximum vertical price is illegal per se). Maximum as well as
minimum price restraints act as an artificial stimulus to the marketplace and therefore are
inimical to the functioning of a free market economy. Id.
38. Id.; Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 399-402 (1911)
(agreements which fix minimum vertical prices are illegal per se). See generally Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal
Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282, 288-90 (1975) (vertical
price restraints which set maximum or minimum price levels are illegal per se).
39. See generally Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the
Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 282, 289-91 (1975) (vertical price fixing historically illegal per se).
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ment that any contract, combination or conspiracy which affects price or
"tend[s] to restrict competition or decrease output" is illegal per se.' The
Court stated that an agreement between a dealer and a manufacturer to undercut and thereby eliminate a discount dealer constitutes illegal price fixing
under the Sherman Act.4 1 Through Dr. Miles and its progeny, the Court
established that vertical price fixing agreements are illegal per se because of
their deleterious effect on competition.4 2
40. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20
(1977) (per se rule applies to restraints which stifle competition); National Soc'y of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (restraints which have anticompetitive impact on trade are illegal per se); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S.
36, 49-51 (1977) (restraints with market impact on price are illegal per se); United States v.
General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 147 (1966) (attempts to eliminate discount retailers in
order to protect franchise dealers has indirect affect on price and is illegal per se); United
States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293, 296 (1945) (price fixing is illegal under Sherman
Act even though affects only local prices); United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321
U.S. 707, 728 (1944) (express agreement or acquiescence to agreement to fix prices is illegal per
se); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 276 (1942) (fixing prices by one member of
group pursuant to express delegation, acquiescence or understanding of others is illegal per se);
Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 466 (1941) (vertical price fixing tends to
create monopolies and lessen competition and is illegal); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150, 153 (1940) (vertical price fixing is illegal per se); Dr. Miles Medical Co., 220
U.S. at 399-402 (agreements or combinations between dealers which have purpose of destruction of competition are illegal per se). See generally Bork, The Rule of Reason and The Per Se
Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 397-404 (1966) (agreements
which divide market and tend to create monopolies have been judged to be illegal per se);
Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution,
HorizontalMerger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282, 290 (1975)
(vertical price restraints have been held illegal per se).
41. Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 757-58
(1988)(Stevens, J. dissenting) (vertical agreements between manufacturer and retailer to terminate discount retailer are illegal); General Motors, 384 U.S. at 146-47 (attempts to eliminate
discount retailers in order to protect franchise dealers has indirect affect on price and is illegal
per se); Dr. Miles Medical Co., 220 U.S. at 399-402 (agreements or combinations between
dealers which have purpose of destruction of competition are illegal per se). See generally
Bork, The Rule of Reason and The PerSe Concept. Price Fixingand Market Division, 75 YALE
L.J. 373, 397-404 (1966) (agreements which divide market tend to create monopolies and are
therefore illegal per se); Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the
Restricted Distribution, HorizontalMerger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 282, 290 (1975) (agreements between manufacturer and retailer to terminate discount
retailer have been held illegal per se).
42. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1977) (vertical
restraints which affect price are deemed illegal per se and it is presumed that affect on price
was motivating factor); see also Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. Inc., 441
U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979) (per se rule applies to vertical restraints because sole purpose is to stifle
competition); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) (price fixing
is illegal per se); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 396 (1927) (reasonableness of price will not be examined since price restraints are presumed illegal); Dr. Miles Medical Co., 220 U.S. at 399-402 (agreements or combinations between dealers which have purpose
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STATUTORY EVOLUTION OF PER SE RULE AS APPLIED TO
VERTICAL PRICE FIXING

The 1890 enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act by Congress instituted,
among other things, a prohibition against vertical price fixing.43 During this
same period, the states sought to regulate intrastate commerce through the
enactment of what are now known as the "Fair Trade Laws."' The "Fair
Trade Laws" permitted a manufacturer of goods to provide in a sales contract a provision stating the minimum, maximum or actual selling price for
its product.4 5 Since these laws sanctioned contracts which affected goods
sold in interstate commerce, federal courts voided them as violative of the
Sherman Act.4 6 However, as part of the effort to stablilize price levels dur-

of destruction of competition are illegal per se); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States,
175 U.S. 211, 264-268 (1899) (agreement amongst competitors to set prices and divide territories are illegal since has affect on price); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166
U.S. 290, 339-43 (1897) (horizontal agreements between competitors to set rates are presumed
illegal). See generally Bork, The Rule of Reason and The Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and
Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 397-404 (1966) (vertical agreements tend to create monopoly power over prices and are therefore to be held illegal per se); Posner, Antitrust Policy and
the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution,HorizontalMerger and Potential
Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282, 290 (1975) (agreements between manufacturer
and retailer to terminate discount retailer have been held illegal per se since sole purpose is
manipulation of price).
43. See Dr. Miles Medical, 220 U. S. at 373 (Sherman Act was enacted to provide that
agreements or combinations between dealers which develop vertical price fixing scheme are
illegal per se); see also United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 153 (1940) (one
purpose of Sherman Act was to establish that agreements amongst competitors as well as
members of distribution chain, such as vertical price fixing, are illegal per se); Trenton Potteries
Co., 273 U.S. at 396 (per se prohibition of Sherman Act is without exception for reasonableness of agreement).
44. See Pepsodent Co. v. Kraus Co., 56 F. Supp. 922, 923-27 (D. La. 1944) (detailed
history of Congressional intent to allow states to enact Fair Trade Laws).
45. See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 407 (1988) (discussion of Fair Trade Laws
and non-signer clauses). The Sherman Act was amended in 1937 to exempt "agreements prescribing minimum prices for ...a commodity which.., is in free and open competition with
commodities of the same general class produced or distributed by others" when such arrangements are legal under state law. See Miller-Tydings Act, 1937 U.S. CODE CONG. ADMIN.
NEWS (50 Stat.) 693 (repealed by Consumer Goods Pricing Act, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 1975 U.S.
CODE CONG. ADMIN. NEWS (89 Stat.) 801 (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 45 (a) (1988))). The
Fair Trade Laws as they have come to be known, allowed the manufacturer to enforce vertical
price fixing schedules against all retailers so long as the manufacturer was able to secure a
contractual agreement with a single retailer to abide by the arrangement. See P. AREEDA,
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 407 (1988) (non-signer clauses). In essence, the Fair Trade Laws allowed enforcement of vertical price fixing schemes against all retailers under a theory that to
bind one retailer was to bind them all. Id.
46. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1977) (contractual restraints which have impact on price are illegal per se); United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 296 (1945) (price fixing is illegal under Sherman Act); United States
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ing the Great Depression, the New Deal Congress passed the Miller-Tydings
Act 7 which revived the "Fair Trade Laws ' 48 by exempting them from the
scope of the Sherman and McGuire Acts.4 9 Miller-Tydings thus permitted
manufacturers to engage in limited vertical price fixing.5 ° By 1975, however,
Congress and the Ford administration5 1 turned against the "Fair Trade
Laws," with Congress eliminating them by passing the Consumer Goods
Pricing Act.52 Congress had determined that the vertical price fixing inher-

v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 276 (1942) (fixing prices through an express delegation, acquiescence or understanding is illegal per se); Fashion Originator's Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S.
457, 466 (1941) (vertical price fixing agreements are illegal); United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) (vertical price fixing is illegal per se); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 396 (1927) (reasonableness of price will not excuse illegality of
vertical price restraints); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373, 399-402
(1911) (agreements or combinations between dealers which have purpose of destruction of
competition are illegal per se).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 45 (1988). The McGuire Act together with § 1
of the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibited restraints on trade. Id. Section 1 of the Sherman Act
specifically provided that: "[elvery contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
48. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). The Sherman Act was amended in 1937 by the Miller Tydings
Act in order to exempt "agreements prescribing minimum prices for the resale of a commodity
which.., is in free and open competition with commodities of the same general class produced
or distributed by others" when such arrangements are legal under state law. Id.
49. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988). The Miller-Tydings Act amended the Sherman Act and
opened the avenue for the "Fair Trade Laws" by allowing the states to enact legislation which
would make vertical price fixing a permissible practice. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
50. Id. The Miller-Tydings Act allowed the imposition of vertical price restraints by
manufacturers under the guise of non-signer clauses. Id. The Act amended the Sherman Act
to provide for "non-signers clauses." Id. This meant that agreements between a manufacturer
and an individual retailer were enforceable against the signer of the agreement as well as all
non-signers once the manufacturer had entered into such an agreement with a single retailer.
Id.
51. See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 407 (1988) (history of Fair Trade Laws).
During the Ford Administration, 1974-1976, the Administration, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Congress called for the repeal of the Fair trade Laws. Id. It was estimated that
the enforcement of the non-signer clauses and the resulting vertical price fixing added at least
18 to 27% to the price of each and every good sold under such an agreement. See S. REP. No.
466, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. ADMIN. NEWS 1569 (1975)
(Fair Trade laws were costly to economy).
52. See Consumer Goods Pricing Act, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS (89 Stat.) 801 (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 45(a)(1988)). The Consumer Goods
Pricing Act amended the Sherman Act in order to make the Fair Trade Laws unenforceable.
Id.; see also P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 407 (1988) (history of Fair Trade Laws).
During the Ford Administration, 1974-1976, the Administration, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Congress called for the repeal of the Fair Trade Laws. Id. It was estimated that
the enforcement of non-signer clauses and the resulting vertical price fixing added at least 18 to
27% to the price of each and every good sold under such an agreement. See S. REP. No. 466,
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ent in the "Fair Trade Laws" was inimical to a free market economy and re53
asserted the per se prohibition against vertical price restraints.

IV. THE NATURE OF AGREEMENTS WHICH RESTRAIN TRADE
Historically, courts held that a contract, combination, or conspiracy in
restraint of trade need not be express but may be implied when a group of
retailers is coerced into acquiescence to a scheme which has the effect of
fixing retail prices.54 Vertical price fixing agreements stifle intrabrand competition by imposing a uniform price, which eliminates any price competition between full service retailers, who charge a higher price but offer better
services, and discount retailers, who sell at a lower price but offer few or no
services. 55 However, the courts and Congress demonstrated a firm resolve to
56
ensure unrestrained intrabrand and interbrand competition.
Vertical price fixing involves an agreement which has the purpose and
effect of manipulating prices.57 In order to be deemed a per se illegal con-

94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1569 (1975)

(Fair Trade Laws were costly to economy).
53. Id. The Consumer Goods Pricing Act reestablished the force of the Sherman Act
making "it illegal for manufacturers to fix the prices of consumer products sold by retailers."
See Public Papers of President Gerald R. Ford, vol. 11, no. 50, at 1368.
54. See United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 721 (1944) (express
or implied agreement to agreement to fix prices is illegal per se); United States v. Masonite
Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 276 (1942) (fixing prices pursuant to an express delegation, acquiescence
or understanding is illegal per se).
55. See Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724-27
(1988) (prohibition of vertical restraints as a detriment to competition is misguided and futile
effort); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54-56 (1977) (vertical restraints reduce intrabrand competition but arguments exist that such loss is merited by increase in interbrand competition).
56. See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 407 (1988) (repeal of Fair Trade Laws dem-

onstrates Congressional resolve to prohibit vertical price fixing). In determining that the Fair
Trade Laws and vertical price fixing were inimical to a free market economy, it was estimated
that the enforcement of the laws and the resulting vertical price fixing added at least 18 to 27%
to the price of each and every good sold under such an agreement. See S. REP. No. 466, 94th
Cong., istSess. 1-3, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. ADMIN. NEWS 1569 (1975) (Fair
Trade Laws were costly to economy and should be abolished). The Consumer Goods Pricing
Act therefore made the Fair Trade Laws unenforceable. Pub. L. No. 94-145, 1975 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (89 Stat.) 801 (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 45(a) (1988)). The Consumer Goods Pricing Act reestablished the force of the Sherman Act making "it illegal for
manufacturers to fix the prices of consumer products sold by retailers." See Public Papers
President Gerald R. Ford, vol. 11, no. 50, at 1368 (Act effectively abolished "Fair Trade
Laws").
57. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 342-51 (1982) (agreements to fix a minimum or maximum price are illegal per se); United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) (agreements to fix price are found in any market manipulation which artificially stimulates price). A combination whose effect is the "raising, depress-
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tract, combination, or conspiracy to manipulate prices, the conduct must be
a bilateral activity.5 8 A bilateral agreement to fix prices occurs when there is
a meeting of the minds between two parties which has the purpose or effect
of manipulating prices.59 If, however, the conduct is unilateral, no violation

of the antitrust laws will occur.'

The Supreme Court addressed unilateral

61
conduct in United States v. Colgate & Co.
In Colgate, a distributor decided to sell only to retailers who would abide

by its price fixing schedule.6 2 The Supreme Court created an exception to
the per se rule by holding that this policy did not violate the Sherman Act
since the policy involved unilateral pricing. 63 However, the Supreme Court
has narrowly applied the Colgate exception to the vertical price fixing prohibition.' The Court noted that an illegal contract, combination, or conspir-

ing, fixing, pegging or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate of foreign commerce"
is an illegal vertical restraint in violation of the Sherman Act. Id.
58. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 n.9 (1984) (manufacturer must seek acquiescence or agreement from distributor who must in turn communicate
his acceptance); United States v. Colgate Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (no illegal vertical
restraint occurs absent a bilateral agreement). Unilateral announcement of a policy to sell only
to retailers who abide by a price schedule with automatic termination for violations is not
illegal per se under the Sherman Act because no bilateral agreement has occurred and therefore there can be no contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade. Id. at 306-07.
59. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 446 (1978) (bilateral
conduct exists when parties are aware that their conduct will have an effect). An agreement
between parties shall have been deemed to have occurred when the parties are aware that their
conduct will cause a particular affect. Id.
60. See, e.g., David-Watkins Co. v. Service Merchandise, 686 F.2d 1190, 1196-97 (6th
Cir. 1982) (unilateral action is not violation of Sherman Act), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 931
(1984); Sierra Wine and Liquor Co. v. Heublein, Inc., 626 F.2d 129, 132-33 (9th Cir. 1980)
(termination of discount retailer based upon unilateral decision is not illegal); Quality Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 542 F.2d 466, 469 (8th Cir. 1976) (if refusal to deal is unilateral,
no violation of Sherman Act has occurred), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977).
61. 250 U.S. 300, 306-07 (1919). Unilateral announcement of a policy to sell only to
retailers who abide by a price schedule with automatic termination for violations is not illegal
per se under the Sherman Act because no bilateral agreement has occurred and therefore there
can be no contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade. Id. at 307.
62. Id. at 303-06.
63. Id. at 307. The plaintiff needs to prove that the conduct was bilateral in order to
prevail. Id. If, however, the conduct is merely unilateral action, no violation of the Sherman
Act has occurred since there can be no contract, combination or conspiracy without an agreement between two or more parties. See, e.g., Davis- Watkins Co., 686 F.2d at 1196-97 (bilateral
action must be shown to prevail since unilateral action is not violation of Sherman Act), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 931 (1984); Sierra Wine and Liquor Co., 626 F.2d at 132-33 (termination of a
discount retailer is not bilateral action for purposes of Sherman); Quality Mercury, Inc., 542
F.2d at 469 (absent bilateral action, no violation of Sherman Act has occurred), cert. denied,
433 U.S. 914 (1977).
64. See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 44 (1960) (Colgate exception
applies only when no agreement exists).
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acy occurs "when a manufacturer's actions .
go beyond mere
announcement of his policy and the simple refusal to deal, and he employs
other means which effect adherence to his vertical prices ... .""

The Col-

gate exception allows a manufacturer to announce a resale price and enforce
compliance by refusing to sell to retailers who do not maintain the
fixed
66
resale price so long as the retailer is free to choose not to comply.
Regarding non-price vertical restraints, courts have applied a Rule of Reason standard to judge whether vertical restraints imposed by a manufacturer, such as geographic, 67 customer list, 68 or tying restrictions, 69 violate
the per se rule.7 ° In Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.," the

65. Id.; see also Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984)
(manufacturer has right to determine with whom he will deal and can announce vertical pricing policy and may unilaterally determine whether or not to cut off discount retailer); United
States v. Colgate Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (manufacturer may make independent decisions about circumstances under which he will sell).
66. See Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. at 44 (scope of Colgate exception). The Colgate
exception is limited to instances in which there is no agreement, neither express nor implied.
Id. Anything in addition to the mere announcement of prices and a refusal to deal with violators is illegal per se. Id.
67. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52-53 (1977) (nonprice vertical restraints such as territorial restraints are legal as judged under Rule of Reason);
White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963) (vertical allocations of dealer
territory are legal under Rule of Reason); Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co.,
243 F.2d 418, 420-21 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (sole outlets are legal under Rule of Reason so long as
does not create monopoly).
68. See United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972) (attempt to
divide customer market is attempt to monopolize which is illegal under the Rule of Reason);
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 230-32 (1899) (any agreement
between businesses performing similar services or dealing in similar products to divide up
marketplace is illegal under Rule of Reason).
69. See United States v. Jerrold Electronics, 187 F. Supp. 545, 561-62 (E.D. Pa. 1960)
(tying arrangements used to promote new industry are judged under Rule of Reason); Standard Oil v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949) (defense that tying arrangement needed
in order to protect goodwill is judged under Rule of Reason). A tying arrangement takes place
when a seller seeks to use its market power in order to capture a similar market share in
another product. Id. at 306-08 (tying arrangements tie together purchases of two or more
products). In order for a tying arrangement to be considered illegal, there must be separate
tying and tied products; the seller must have sufficient market power to restrain competition in
the tied product; and the tying arrangement must have more than a de minimis affect on
commerce. Id. at 313-15 (tying arrangements may be permissive ifjustified in order for manufacturer to survive so long as minimal market effect is caused).
70. See Continental T. V., Inc., 433 U.S. at 553 (non-price vertical restraints such as territorial restraints are legal as judged under Rule of Reason). In judging whether or not a nonprice vertical restraint is illegal under the Rule of Reason, all circumstances are to be weighed
by the trier of fact. Id. Only those restrictions which "would always or almost always tend to
restrict competition and decrease output" are illegal per se. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289 (1985) (purchasing cooperatives are procompetitive by increasing economic efficiency).
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Supreme Court stated that some non-price vertical restraints can create efficiencies in the chain of distribution and enhance interbrand competition.72
The Rule of Reason enables courts to balance the competition-enhancing
aspects of a non-price vertical restraint against their anticompetitive effects
in order to determine their legality."
V.

THE LEGAL IMPACT OF THE PER SE RULE:
THE ACADEMIC DEBATE

Until the Sharp decision, the United States Supreme Court generally held
vertical price fixing to be illegal per se. However, two schools of thought
developed as to the propriety of this policy: the Harvard School and the
Chicago School. The Harvard School approved the Supreme Court's preSharp antitrust jurisprudence and thereby asserted the general policy that
restraints on vertical prices are per se illegal. 74 Three tenets form the basis

71. 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977) (Court stated that enhancement of interbrand competition, which is competition among different brands of the same product, is foremost concern of
Sherman Act); see also Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717,
725-27 (1988) (intrabrand competition is not prime concern of antitrust legislation but rather
interbrand is primary concern). See generally Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 18-22 (1981) (discussion of policy behind interbrand and intrabrand competition). Interbrand competition is the
primary concern of antitrust law because it seeks economic efficiency amongst all competing
brands rather than within an individual brand. Id.
72. See Continental T V., Inc., 433 U.S. at 52 (vertical restraints enhance intrabrand
competition).
73. Id. at 57-59 (Rule of Reason is balancing test). In judging whether or not a non-price
vertical restraint is illegal under the Rule of Reason, all circumstances are to be weighed by the
trier of fact. Id. Only those restrictions which "would always or almost always tend to restrict
competition and decrease output" are illegal per se. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc.
v. Pacific Stationery & Print Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289 (1985) (Rule of Reason weighs economic
efficiency).
74. See Report by the House Judiciary Committee on the Price Fixing Prevention Act of
1989, 835 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 10-12 (April 11, 1990) (discussion of divergence of Chicago
School from Harvard School). The policy of antitrust legislation and judicial interpretation
thereof has historically been the per se prohibition of vertical price fixing. Id.; see also National Soc'y of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (vertical price
restraints are illegal per se); Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-51
(1977) (restraints with market impact on price are illegal per se); United States v. General
Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 147 (1966) (attempts to eliminate discount retailers in order to
protect franchise dealers has indirect affect on price and is illegal per se); United States v.
Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293, 296 (1945) (price fixing is illegal under Sherman Act even
though affects only local prices); Fashion Originator's Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 466 (1941)
(vertical price fixing creates monopoly power and is illegal); United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 153 (1940) (vertical price fixing is illegal per se); FTC v. Pacific States
Paper Trade Ass'n, 273 U.S. 52, 62 (1926) (express or tacit price restraints are illegal); Dr.
Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, Co., 220 U.S. 373, 399-402 (1911) (agreements or
combinations between dealers which have affect on price are illegal per se).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol22/iss4/9

14

Pettit: In Sharp Contrast to the Past: The Demise of the Per Se Rule agai

1991]

COMMENTS

1089

of the Harvard School's analysis of vertical restraints, namely: (1) if an
agreement directly or indirectly sets prices, then it is price fixing which is

illegal per se;75 (2) if an agreement is a non-price vertical restraint, the Rule

of Reason applies;76 and (3) if an agreement affecting prices occurs within a
single business entity, i.e., a subsidiary or agent then no violation occurs.77
While the Harvard School maintains that vertical agreements which explicitly state price and those which affect price are illegal per se,7" the Chicago School applies the per se prohibition only to those vertical price fixing

75. See Nat'l Soc'y of ProfessionalEngineers, 435 U.S. at 688 (restraints which have impact on price are illegal per se); Continental T V., Inc., 433 U.S. at 49-51 (restraints with
market impact on price are illegal per se); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979) (per se rule applies to restraints which affect price); General
Motors, 384 U.S. at 147 (attempts to eliminate discount retailers in order to protect franchise
dealers has indirect affect on price and is illegal per se); Frankfort Distilleries,324 U.S. at 296
(price fixing is illegal under Sherman Act even though affects only local prices); United States
v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 276 (1941) (fixing prices by one member of group pursuant to
express delegation, acquiescence or understanding is illegal per se); United States v. Fashion
Originator's Guild, 312 U.S. 457, 466 (1941) (vertical price fixing tends to create monopoly
power over prices and is illegal); Socony- Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 153 (vertical price fixing
is illegal per se); Pacific States Paper Trade, 273 U.S. at 62 (express or tacit agreement on price
is illegal); Dr. Miles Medical Co., 220 U.S. at 399-402 (agreements or combinations between
dealers which have purpose of destruction of competition are illegal per se).
76. See Continental T V., Inc., 433 U.S. at 52-53 (non-price vertical restraints are legal as
judged under Rule of Reason). The application of the Rule of Reason is within the province of
the jury to determine whether, through the facts shown, a contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade has arisen. Id. The presumption is in favor of the legality of the
restraint and only those restrictions which "would always or almost always tend to restrict
competition and decrease output" are illegal per se. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc.
v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289 (1985) (purchasing cooperatives are
judged legal under Rule of Reason).
77. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984) (manufacturer has right to determine with whom he will deal, can announce vertical pricing policy and
may unilaterally determine whether or not to cut off a discount retailer); United States v.
Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 35-47 (1960) (any attempt to induce compliance with vertical
price fixing scheme beyond mere unilateral action is illegal per se); FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing
Co., 257 U.S. 441, 452 (1922) (manufacturers may use unilateral action to institute vertical
price fixing scheme but may not use concerted activity); United States v. Colgate Co., 250 U.S.
300, 307 (1919) (manufacturer may make independent decisions about the circumstances
under which he will sell).
78. See National Soc'y of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688
(1978) (restraints with anticompetitive impact on price are illegal per se); Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1977) (agreements which affect price are illegal); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979)
(restraints with detrimental effect on price competition are illegal per se). See generally Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restrict Distribution,Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282, 290 (1979) (vertical
price restraints have been traditionally held illegal per se).
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agreements which explicitly state price.79 This fundamental distinction has
lead to substantially divergent approaches to antitrust jurisprudence. The
Chicago School posits four basic tenets in its approach to vertical price re-

straints, namely: (1) if an agreement directly states a price, then it is verti-

cal price fixing, which is illegal per se;8 ° (2) if an agreement does not directly
state a price, but merely affects prices indirectly, it is a non-price vertical

restraint to be adjudged under the Rule of Reason;8" (3) if an agreement

imposes a non-price vertical restraint, then the Rule of Reason applies; 2 and
(4) if an agreement affects only a single business entity, i.e. a subsidiary or
83
agent then no violation occurs.

79. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, Co., 220 U.S. 373, 399-402 (1911)
(agreements or combinations between dealers which have affect on price are illegal per se).
Contra Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 735-36 (1988)
(case altered precedent by holding that only agreements which explicitly state price are illegal
per se rather than all agreements which affect price).
80. See United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293, 296 (1945) (price fixing is
illegal under Sherman Act even though affects only local prices); United States v. Masonite
Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 276 (1941) (fixing prices by one member of group pursuant to express
delegation, acquiescence or understanding of others is illegal per se); Fashion Originator's
Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 466 (1941) (contract providing for vertical price fixing is illegal
per se); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 153 (1940) (vertical price
fixing is illegal per se); FTC v. Pac. States Paper Trade Ass'n., 273 U.S. 52, 62 (1927) (express
or tacit agreement on price is illegal); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S.
373, 399-402 (agreements between dealers which provide for vertical price fixing are illegal per
se).
81. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979)
(all vertical restraints are subject to Rule of Reason unless they stifle competition and decrease
economic efficiency); National Soc'y of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
690 (1978) (Court will look at nature of restraint and surrounding circumstances to determine
competitive merits of restraint); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53
(1977) (non-price vertical restraints cannot be absolutely prohibited because they have potential to stimulate interbrand competition despite reduction in intrabrand competition). See generally Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted
Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282,
283-99 (1975) (procompetitive merits of vertical restraints).
82. See Continental T.V., Inc., v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-59 (1977) (nonprice vertical restraints such as territorial restraints are legal under Rule of Reason); Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Print Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289 (1985)
(purchasing cooperatives are procompetitive by increasing economic efficiency). Only those
restraints which clearly have anticompetitive effects on the market place are to be deemed
illegal. Id.
83. See, e.g., Davis-Watkins Co. v. Service Merchandise, 686 F.2d 1190, 1196-97 (6th
Cir. 1982) (unilateral action is not violation of Sherman Act), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 931
(1984); Sierra Wine and Liquor Co. v. Heublein, Inc., 626 F.2d 129, 132-33 (9th Cir. 1980)
(termination of discount retailer based upon unilateral decision not illegal); Quality Mercury,
Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 542 F.2d 466, 469 (8th Cir. 1976) (if refusal to deal is unilateral, no
violation of Sherman Act has occurred, but if more than unilateral action such action is illegal
combination), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977).
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Judges such as Robert Bork and Richard A. Posner have integrated the
Chicago School's approach into common law antitrust policy. s4 They contend that vertical price fixing sometimes may produce efficient results, thus
meriting the use of the Rule of Reason, even though that rule is normally

used only to judge vertical non-price restraints.8 5 The Chicago School and
its subscribers believe that only horizontal restraints, that is, restraints which

affect interbrandcompetition, are illegal per se. 6 The Chicago School recognizes that the Rule of Reason should sometimes apply to vertical restraints
because competition among distributors of the same brand differs fundamentally from competition among distributors of different brands of the same
product.8 7 The Chicago School asserts that manufacturers who support

84. See Continental T. V., Inc., 433 U.S. at 53 (argument can be made that decreases in
intrabrand competition are legal based upon procompetitive benefits gained in interbrand com-

petition). See generally R.

BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX

280 (1978) (discussing Chicago

School approach to vertical price fixing); Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of
Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6 (1981) (vertical price fixing
agreements should be legal per se); Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, HorizontalMerger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75
COLUM. L. REV 282, 283-99 (1975) (vertical restraints offer procompetitive benefits). The
Chicago School of Antitrust argues that vertical price fixing has little or no affect on the econ-

omy and in fact has procompetitive benefits. See R.

BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX

280

(1978) (vertical price fixing enhance interbrand competition); Posner, Antitrust Policy and the
Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential
Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282, 283-99 (1975) (decrease in intrabrand competition caused by vertical price fixing is merited by increase in interbrand competition). Commentators have urged that vertical price fixing be deemed legal per se as a part of the Chicago
School approach to shift the focus of antitrust protection away from intrabrand competition.
Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48
U. CHI. L. REV. 6 (1981) (per se legality of vertical price fixing would enhance competition).
85. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47-59 (1977) (nonprice vertical restraints are judged under Rule of Reason). The trier of fact shall weigh all the
circumstances in order to determine whether or not a non-price vertical restraint is illegal
under the Rule of Reason. Id. Upon doing so, only those restrictions which "would always or
almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output" are illegal per se. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Print Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289-90 (1985)
(Rule of Reason attempts to increase economic efficiency).
86. See Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 734-36
(1988) (horizontal restraints are illegal per se because sole purpose is detriment of price competition amongst competitors). But see California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 103 (1980) (price fixing in vertical cases is same as price fixing in
horizontal cases). See generally E. GELLHORN, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 252, 256
(1976) (vertical restraints have affect of facilitating horizontal agreements); R. POSNER, ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES AND OTHER MATERIALS 134 (1974) (vertical restraints
may be as inimical as horizontal restraints since acts as disincentive to break up cartels).
87. See Business Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. at 724 (vertical restraints are procompetitive). The Court distinguished competition amongst retailers of different brands of the same
product (interbrand competition) from competition amongst dealers of the same name brand
product (intrabrand competition). Id. "[W]e found, they (vertical restraints) had real poten-
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their distributors by eliminating discount distributors, (i.e., those who obtain
a "free ride" on the marketing programs of full service dealers) produce the
most efficient result for the market and should therefore be judged under the
Rule of Reason.8"
The Chicago School maintains that eliminating "free riders" will enhance
interbrand competition and promote efficient markets. 9 The Chicago
tial to stimulate interbrand competition, 'the primary concern of antitrust law.'" Id. See R.
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 280 (1978) (vertical price fixing enhances interbrand competition); Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court.- An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Mergerand Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282, 294-

97 (1975) (decrease in intrabrand competition caused by vertical price fixing will be more than
offset by increase in interbrand competition).
88. See Business Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. at 723-30 (argument that vertical restraints

have redeeming values); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762-64
(1984) (manufacturer is justified in imposing vertical restraints in order to insure profit level
sufficient for distributor to institute marketing strategy); Continental T. V., Inc., 433 U.S. 55-56

(argument that vertical restraints promote effective distribution schemes). See generally R.
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978) (marketplace needs no protection from trade restraints); Tesler, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282, 283299 (1975) (vertical restraints have procompetitive benefits); Bork, The Rule ofReason and the
Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division II, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 389 (1966) (vertical
restraints facilitate competition). The Chicago School argues that the imposition of vertical
restraints in order to eliminate the "free rider" effect is justified. Id. at 430-438, 453. The
"free rider" effect refers to the burden placed upon local sales of a name brand product when
one distributor actively advertises the product and another simply saves that money which
would have been expended on advertising and in essence takes a free ride on the efforts of his
competitor. Id. The Chicago School states that vertical restraints aimed at the elimination of
the "free rider" effect are justified since they promote the profitability of the name brand product by streamlining the distribution process. Id. If the "free rider" were to continue, the full
service retailer would find it less profitable to sell the brand and therefore would make less
effort to promote it. Id. Without the necessity to compete against a discount retailer who free
rides upon the effort of a full service retailer, retailers subject to vertical restraints can pass on
to consumers savings from the elimination of duplicated services. Id.
89. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977) (Chicago
policy toward vertical restraints). One Chicago school commentator has stated that:
[v]ertical restraints reduce intrabrand competition by limiting the number of sellers of a
particular product competing for the business of a given group of buyers. . . .Vertical
restrictions promote interbrand competition by allowing the manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution of his products.
Id.; see also Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 727-30 (vertical restraints may be cure for free rider affect); Monsanto Co., 465 U.S. at 763-64 (manufacturer is justified in imposing vertical restraints in order to cure free rider affect); Continental
T V., Inc., 433 U.S. at 55-56 (argument that vertical restraints promote effective distribution
schemes by elimination of free riders). The imposition of vertical price fixing is simply an
attempt by the manufacturer to protect those retailers whose marketing policies are in conformity with its wishes or give an incentive to others to act in conformity therewith. See
generally R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 148-49 (1976) (economic argument for vertical price fixing); Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of
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School's policy for supporting vertical price restraints is based on the belief
that the termination of "free riders" will increase interbrand competition
and will force manufacturers to grant better warranties and better service
support for their products in order to remain competetive with other brands

of the same product. 90 However, the Harvard School contends that this

problem can be better addressed through contractual provisions between retailers and consumers, which would obviate the harmful effects of vertical
price fixing. 91 Finally, the Harvard School followers stated that the arguments espoused by the Chicago School should be addressed to the Congress
rather than the judiciary because the Chicago theory is in direct opposition
to the Congressional intent behind the Sherman Act. 92
VI.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE CHICAGO SCHOOL UPON THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Through amicus briefs, procedural guidelines, and nonfeasance, the antitrust division of the Department of Justice has chosen to ignore the eighty
years of precedent which established the per se illegality of vertical price
restraints. 93 Because of their particular ideological approach to antitrust juRestricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6 (1981) (vertical price fixing
agreements should be legal per se to promote marketing scheme of manufacturer and prevent
free rider affect); Tesler, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J. L. & EcON. 86,
89-96 (1960) (discussing vertical price fixing as incentive system); Bork, The Rule of Reason
and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division 11, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 430-438, 453
(1966) (vertical restraints are economically efficient and should be legal to prevent free riders).
90. Id. See generally R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 280-98 (1978) (vertical price
fixing protects distributors and retailers who undertake promotion projects and conduct other
services to promote goodwill of product); R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 148-49 (1976) (economic conditions for vertical price fixing); Posner, The Next Step
in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6
(1981) (vertical price fixing agreements should be legal per se to promote manufacturer's marketing scheme and prevent affect of free rider); Tesler, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair
Trade?, 3 J. L. & ECON. 86, 89-96 (1976) (discussing an incentive system using vertical price
fixing).
91. See Report by House Committee on the Judiciary on the Freedom from Vertical Price
Fixing Act of 1987, 835 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13 (Nov. 16, 1987) (Harvard School contends
that reasons enunciated for vertical price fixing can be better solved by contractual provision).
Contra R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 280-98 (1978) (vertical price fixing protects distributors and retailers who undertake promotion projects and conduct other services to promote goodwill of product).
92. See Report by House Committee on the Judiciary on the Freedom from Vertical Price
Fixing Act of 1987, 835 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13-15 (Nov. 16, 1987) (Harvard School follows legislative intent rather than court created law).
93. Report by the House Judiciary Committee on the Price Fixing Prevention Act of
1989, 835 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 6-7 (April 11, 1990); Report by House Committee on the
Judiciary on the Freedom from Vertical Price Fixing Act of 1987, 835 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
14 (Nov. 16, 1987).
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risprudence, the Department of Justice has not brought a single vertical
price fixing charge in over ten years despite numerous appeals from civil
litigants, and thus has abandoned legal action against manufacturers who
94
impose vertical price restraints.
In addition to the Justice Department's nonfeasance regarding the enforcement of the per se prohibition against vertical price fixing, the Department took positive steps towards overturning the per se rule, established by
Dr.Miles, through amicus briefs on behalf of defendant manufacturers." In
the Monsanto case, the Department of Justice filed amicus curiae briefs with
the Supreme Court supporting manufacturers charged with vertical price fixing. 96 In these briefs, the Justice Department urged the Court to overrule its
longstanding decision in Dr. Miles and adopt the Rule of Reason approach
to vertical price restraints enunciated by the Chicago School. 97
The intervention of the Justice Department did not go unnoticed. Congress addressed the intervention of the Justice Department in the Department of Justice Appropriations Bill of 1984,98 which contained a narrowly
defined funding restriction that prohibited the Department from using public
funds to pursue the overturning or altering of the per se prohibition against
vertical price fixing. 99 This bill became law on November 28, 1983, and

94. Report by the House Judiciary Committee on the Price Fixing Prevention Act of
1989, 835 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 2 (April 11, 1990).
95. Briefs for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioner, Monsanto
Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (No. 82-914); see also, Testimony of William F. Baxter, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, Oversight Hearings, Subcomm. on
Monopolies and Commercial Law, House Comm. on the Judiciary 7 (97th Cong., 1st and 2d
Sessions, 1983). Further, the Assistant Attorney General, Mr. Baxter, at a subcommittee
meeting told the Congress that the Administration would not be actively seeking to enforce the
vertical price fixing prohibition and went on to state that "there is no such thing as a harmful
vertical practice." Id.
96. Briefs for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioner, Monsanto
Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (No. 82-914).
97. Id. (citing Testimony of William F. Baxter, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, Oversight Hearings, Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law, House Comm. on
the Judiciary at 7 (97th Cong., 1st and 2nd Sessions, 1983)). "Even if the evidence shows that
Monsanto adopted the challenged marketing program as part of a vertical price fixing scheme,
this Court should still vacate and remand because vertical price fixing should not be deemed
per se unlawful." Id.
98. Department of Justice Appropriations Bill of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-166, § 510, 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (97 Stat.) 1071, 1102-03 (1983).

99. Department of Justice Appropriations Bill of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-166, § 605, 1984

U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (97 Stat.) 1071, 1102-03 (1983). Section 605 stated that

the Department of Justice Guidelines were inconsistent with prior caselaw and the Congressional intent on any antitrust issues and that:
certain price fixing conspiracies are legal if such conspiracies are 'limited' to restricting
intrabrand competition; by blurring the distinction between price and nonprice restraints
in analyzing the accepted rule that vertical price fixing in any context is illegal per se; in
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similar restrictions have since been placed on the Department of Justice via
restrictive appropriation bills."°° In response, the Department of Justice
promulgated its Vertical Guidelines of 1985 which suggested that it would
not prosecute vertical price agreements so long as they were "ancillary" to
an agreement which was primarily non-price in nature and did not set a
"specific price.""' While the Department of Justice stated that it would
abide by Congress's decision to uphold the per se illegality of vertical price
02
fixing, it went on to state that it would not actively prosecute wrongdoers.'
Frustrated by the resolve of the Department of Justice to circumvent the
per se rule, Congress passed the Vertical Restraints Guidelines Resolution in
1985,103 which stated that the Justice Department's Vertical Guidelines did
not have the effect of law, and thus did "not accurately state the current
antitrust law, and shall not be considered by the courts of the United States
as binding or persuasive. '""
The resolution declared the Justice Depart-

stating that vertical restraints that have an impact upon prices are subject to the per se
rule of illegality only if there is an 'explicit agreement as to specific prices'; in stating that
restraints imposed by a manufacturer at the request of dealers are non-price in nature and
therefore not subject to the per se rule of illegality; in aggregating the factors of collusion
and foreclosure, thereby failing to distinguish adequately between the separate antitrust
concerns associated with vertical territorial restraints and with exclusive dealing practices; in stating that less than absolute territorial restraints are 'always legal'; and in arbitrarily specifying a 30 per centrum minimum market share in tying product for assessing
the legality of tying arrangements.
Id. These restrictions prevented the Justice Department from arguing the Chicago School
approach to the judiciary by restricting the use of public funds for such purposes. See generally Campbell, The Antitrust Record of the FirstReagan Administration, 64 TEx. L. REV. 351,
359 (1985) (Congress uses power of purse to stifle Justice Department actions). However, it
has been argued that serious constitutional problems are evoked by these funding restrictions.
Id. The separation of powers provided in the Constitution seems clearly to be breached when
the Justice Department is prohibited from speaking to the Supreme Court on antitrust matters
despite a direct invitation to do so. Id. It has been stated that: "[T]he spectacle of the first
branch of the federal government (the legislature] ordering the second branch [the executive]
not to speak to the third raises serious constitutional problems." Id.
100. Department of Justice Appropriations Bill of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-166, § 510, 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (97 Stat.) 1071, 1102-03 (1983).
101. Department of Justice Vertical Restraint Guidelines, 687 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
Part I (1985).
102. Id. Frustrated by the imposition of a prohibition of Justice Department lobbying to
alter the antitrust laws, the Department of Justice simply stated that it would not bring any
public enforcement actions for violations of the per se illegality of vertical price fixing. Id.
The only avenue left open to the enforcement of the per se rule was private actions by the
injured plaintiffs themselves. Id.
103. Vertical Restraints Guidelines Resolution, Pub. L. No. 99-180, § 605, 1985 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (99 Stat.) 1169 (1985) (disavowing validity of the Justice Department's Vertical Restraint Guidelines).
104. Id. (Congress declares that Justice Department Guidelines are in contravention to
Congressional mandate).
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ment's guidelines to be a direct contradiction of clear congressional mandates by their (1) "suggesting that certain price fixing conspiracies are legal
if. . . limited to restricting intrabrand competition;" 10 5 (2) "blurring the
distinction between price and non-price restraints ... thereby questioning
the accepted rule that vertical price fixing is illegal per se;" 1" (3) "stating
that vertical restraints that have an impact upon prices are subject to the per
se rule of illegality only if there is an 'explicit agreement as to specific
prices;' "107 and (4) "stating that restraints imposed by a manufacturer at
the request of dealers are non-price in nature and therefore not subject to the
per se rule of illegality." 10 8 However, the Vertical Restraints Guidelines
Resolution was ineffective because the philosophy of the Chicago School had
taken root in the judiciary, and grew to fruition in the Supreme Court's
Monsanto and Sharp decisions. 10 9
VII.

BREAKING WITH THE PAST: THE INFLUENCE OF THE CHICAGO
SCHOOL ON THE SUPREME COURT

In Monsanto Company v. Spray-Rite Service Corporation,11 ° the Supreme
Court began to resolve the struggle between Congress and the executive
branch over the necessity of a per se prohibition against vertical price fixing. 11 In so doing, the Court in Monsanto abandoned the rule that vertical
price fixing is inferred when the plaintiff proves that: (1) the manufacturer
received communications complaining about the competition from the plaintiff, and (2) the manufacturer terminated its supply based upon this communication.112 The Court held that a plaintiff must prove "something more"
105. Id.

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Vertical Restraints Guidlines Resolution, Pub. L. No. 99-180, § 605, 1985 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (99 Stat.) 1169 (1985).
109. See Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723-36
(1988) (case altered precedent by adopting Chicago School approach that only agreements
which explicitly state price rather than all agreements which affect price are illegal per se);

Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984) (Court adopted more stringent burden of proof in vertical price fixing cases).
110. 465 U.S. at 752. In Monsanto, a distributor of herbicides brought an antitrust action
against the manufacturer alleging that the manufacturer had conspired with other distributors
to terminate the plaintiff due to his price-cutting practices. Id. at 755-57. The district court as
well as the court of appeals held in favor of the plaintiff distributor. Id. at 758. The United
States Supreme Court affirmed in favor of the plaintiff but readdressed the burden of proof

which plaintiffs bear in proving the existence of a price-fixing conspiracy. Id. at 768.
111. Report by the House Judiciary Committee on the Price Fixing Prevention Act of
1989, 835 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 9-10 (April 11, 1990).
112. Monsanto v. Spray-Rite Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 760 n.4 (1984). The Court recognized

the standard that the plaintiff need only prove that the manufacturer and the competing retailer had communicated in reference to the discounting retailer and that the discounting re-
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than mere evidence of complaints in order to establish a conspiracy to fix
prices. 13 Instead, the Court asserted that the plaintiff must disprove the
existence of any or all hypothetical business reasons that might justify the
manufacturer's termination of a dealer.1 4 Further, the Court stated that in
addition to providing evidence which tends to show the existence of a conspiracy to fix prices, the plaintiff must also prove "that the manufacturer and
the non-terminated dealer were acting independently.""' 5 Thus, Monsanto
indicated that for a plaintiff to prevail on an action for illegal vertical price
fixing, the plaintiff must not only prove a conspiracy to fix prices but also
disprove the possible existence of all potential business reasons that might
justify the termination of a distributor by the manufacturer." 6 This constitutes a virtually insurmountable double-barrelled
burden of proof which is
17
statute.'
or
precedent
by
unsupported
In response to Monsanto, Congress passed House Bill 585 in 1987.' l8
However, the Supreme Court decided Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp
Electronics Corp. 19 before the bill was passed by the Senate.' 20 The Sharp

tailer was terminated in response thereto. Id. However, the Court went on to state that in
addition to the enunciated standard, "something more" need be shown in order to prove an
agreement exists. Id. at 764; see also Report by House Committee on the Judiciary on the
Price Fixing Prevention Act of 1989, 100 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1-2 (April 11, 1990) (evidentiary standard prior to and after Monsanto decision).
113. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764. "Something more than evidence of complaints is
needed." Id.
114. Id.; see also Report by House Committee on the Judiciary on the Freedom from
Vertical Price fixing Act of 1987, 835 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 14 (Nov. 16, 1987) (evidentiary
standard has been altered). Now in order to prevail, the plaintiff need prove that:
(1) the manufacturer received communications about the competition of the discount
retailer;
(2) the manufacturer terminated its supply to the discount retailer as a result thereof;
(3) no possibility exists that the manufacturer and the competing retailer were acting
independently.
Id.
115. Monsanto v. Spray-Rite Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984) (Court imposed heightened
burden of proof).
116. Id.; see also Report by House Committee on the Judiciary on the Freedom from
Vertical Price fixing Act of 1987, 835 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 4-5 (Nov. 16, 1987) (addition to
evidentiary burden placed upon plaintiff).
117. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764 (plaintiff's burden of proof). Now in order to prevail, the
plaintiff must show that the manufacturer received complaints from a full service retailer about
the price cutting retailer and that the termination was based upon these communications, as
well as exclude all possible legal explanations for the conduct. Id. This is unjustified by the
case precedent which simply demanded that the plaintiff prove that the manufacturer received
complaints about the discount retailer and the discount retailer was terminated as a result
thereof. Id.
118. 100th Congress, House of Representatives, 35 Cong. Index (CCH) 10 (1987-1988).
119. 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
120. S. 585, 100th Congress, 2d Sess. (1988) (Court adopted Chicago approach before
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decision sent shockwaves through Congress and led the House Judiciary
Committee to revise and expand its efforts to countermand both the Department of Justice's nonfeasance and
the Supreme Court's divergence from pre12
cedent in Sharp and Monsanto. '
While Monsanto had dramatically altered the burden of proof in vertical
price fixing actions, Sharp represented a far more sweeping break with the
22
past-it abandoned the per se rule against vertical price fixing. In Sharp,
a retail dealer complained to its supplying manufacturer regarding losses
caused by the competition of a discount retailer in the same geographic location.' 23 The retailer contended that the discounter was a "free rider" who
unjustly benefitted from the retailer's aggressive market campaign and warranty policies. ' 24 Shortly after receiving these complaints, the manufacturer
terminated the supply of goods sold to the discount retailer. 25 The discount
retailer brought an action alleging that the manufacturer's action represented an illegal conspiracy to fix prices and thus violated the Sherman
Act. 126 The Supreme Court found that the manufacturer and the retailer
had not illegally fixed prices despite the fact that their agreement would have

Congress countered Monsanto); see also Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.,
485 U.S. 717 (1988) (case altered precedent by holding that only agreements which explicitly
state price are illegal per se rather than all agreements which affect price).
121. See Report by House Committee on the Judiciary on the Price Fixing Prevention
Act of 1989, 100 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 25 (April 11, 1990) (H.R. 1236 was drafted to

replace H.R. 585 which was drafted prior to Sharp decision); Report by House Committee on
the Judiciary on the Freedom from Vertical Price Fixing Act of 1987, 835 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 4-5 (Nov. 16, 1987) (H.R. 585 was drafted to respond to increased evidentiary burden
placed upon plaintiffs by Monsanto decision).
122. 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
123. Id. at 721. Sharp Electronics published a minimum vertical price schedule which a
competing retailer adhered to. Id. Business Electronics is a discount retailer who competed in
the same geographic marketplace but did not adhere to Sharp's price schedule. Id. Sharp
Electronics and Business Electronics continued to do business together for several years despite the failure on Business Electronics' part to follow the price schedule. Id.
124. Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 725 (1988) (full
service retailer claimed that Electronics was a "free rider"). Sharp Electronics contended that
a manufacturer may terminate a discount retailer who is free riding even at the request of a
competing retailer because the manufacturer has an interest to protect product's reputation as
well as to the consumer by insuring that the services provided by its retailer conform with the
goodwill of the business. Id.
125. See Business Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. at 721.
126. Id. at 736. The terminated dealer brought an action alleging that the actions between the full service retailer and Sharp Electronics constituted a conspiracy in violation of the
per se illegality of vertical price restraints under § 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 721. The trial
court found for the plaintiff and determined that a conspiracy to fix prices had indeed been
formed despite the fact that no express agreement to set prices at a specific price level was
agreed upon. Id. at 719-20.
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the ultimate effect of fixing prices. 127
In effect, the Supreme Court overruled the Dr. Miles decision. 128 For over
eighty years, Dr. Miles and its progeny stated the rule that agreements between manufacturers and retailers which have the effect of fixing a brand's
prices are illegal per se. 12 9 The Sharp decision narrowed the scope of the per
se illegality under the Sherman
Act to encompass only those agreements
30
which explicitly fix prices.1

VIII.

THE PRICE FIXING PREVENTION ACT OF

1991

In response to Sharp, Congress drafted House Resolution 1236 which has
since been reintroduced as House Resolution 1470."'' According to the
House Judiciary Committee (the "Committee"), H.R. 1236 and its successor
127. 780 F.2d 1212, 1215-18 (1986), aff'd, 485 U.S. 717, 720 (1988) (in absence of express
or implied agreement to set prices at certain level no illegal vertical restraint exists).
128. See Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 733-36
(1988) (agreement will not be per se illegal unless there is express agreement as to price level to
be affixed). Contra Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, Co., 220 U.S. 373, 399-402
(1911) (agreements which have affect on price are illegal per se).
129. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1977)
(per se rule applies to restraints which stifle price competition); National Soc'y of Professional
Eng'r v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (restraints which have anticompetitive affect
on prices are illegal per se); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-51
(1977) (restraints with market impact on price are illegal per se); United States v. General
Motors, Inc., 384 U.S. 127, 147 (1966) (attempts to eliminate discount retailers in order to
protect franchise dealers has indirect affect on price and is illegal per se); United States v.
Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 296 (1945) (price fixing is illegal under Sherman Act
even though affects only local prices); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 276
(1942) (fixing prices by one member of group pursuant to express delegation, acquiescence or
understanding of others is illegal per se); Fashion Originator's Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 466
(1941) (vertical price fixing tends to create monopolies and lessen competition and is illegal);
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940) (vertical price fixing is
illegal per se); FTC v. Pacific States Paper Trade Ass'n, 273 U.S. 52, 62 (1926) (express or tacit
agreement on price is illegal); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373,
399-403 (1911) (agreements or combinations between dealers which have purpose of destruction of competition are illegal per se).
130. See Business Electronic Corp., 485 U.S. at 723-36 (agreement will not be per se illegal
unless there is express agreement as to price level to be affixed).
131. H.R. 1236, 101st Congress, 1st Sess. (1989); H.R. 1470, 102d Congress, 1st Sess.
(1991). The Price Fixing Prevention Acts of 1989 and 1991 are identical and provide that:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE
This Act may be cited as the "Price Fixing Prevention Act of 1991".
SECTION 2. EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS IN FEDERAL CIVIL ANTITRUST ACTIONS RELATING TO PRICE FIXING.
(a) In any civil action based on a claim arising under section 1 or 3 of the Sherman Act
(15 U.S.C. 1, 3) and alleging a contract combination, or conspiracy to set, change, or
maintain prices (other than a maximum price), evidence that a person who sells a good or
service to the claimant for resale-
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H.R. 1470 have three purposes. 132 First, the bills announce themselves as
Congress's response to ten years of inaction by the Justice Department to
prosecute manufacturers who violated the per se rule against vertical price
fixing. 13 3 Second, the bills seek to reestablish the proper evidentiary burden
placed upon plaintiffs, which would effectively overturn the Supreme Court's
decision in Monsanto.134 Third, and finally, the bills purport to nullify Sharp

(1) received from a competitor of the claimant a communication regarding price competition by the claimant in the vertical of a good or service, and
(2) in response to such communication terminated the claimant as a buyer of a good or
service for resale, or refused to supply to the claimant some or all of such goods or services requested by the claimant, shall be sufficient to raise the inference that such person
and such competitor engaged in concerted action to set, or maintain prices for such good
or service in violation of such section. For purposes of this subsection, a termination or
refusal to supply is in response to a communication if such communication is a substantial
contributing cause of such termination or refusal to supply. Nothing herein shall preclude the court from entering judgment in favor of the defendant, at trial or prior thereto,
if the court determines on the basis of all of the evidence and pleadings submitted by the
parties, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the requirements of
the subsection, that no such inference of concerted action can reasonably be drawn by the
trier of fact.
(b) In any civil action based on a claim arising under section 1 or 3 of the Sherman Act
(15 U.S.C. 1, 3), and alleging a contract, combination, or conspiracy to set, change, or
maintain prices, the fact that the seller of a good or service and the purchaser of such
good or service entered into an agreement to set, change, or maintain the price (other than
a maximum price) of such good or service for vertical shall be sufficient to constitute a
violation of such section. An agreement between the seller of a good or service and the
purchaser of such good or service to terminate another purchaser as a dealer or to refuse
to supply such other purchaser because of that purchaser's pricing policies shall constitute
a violation of such section, whether or not a specific price or price level is agreed upon.
SEC. 3. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to change the requirement of the Sherman Act
that a violation of section 1 or 3 of such Act may only be found upon a determination that
the defendant entered into an illegal contract, combination, or conspiracy.
SEC. 4. RULE OF REASON STANDARD
(a) IN GENERAL-Nothing in this Act shall affect the application of the rule-of-reason standard to vertical location clauses or vertical territorial restraints under the antitrust laws.
(b) DEFINITION.-For purposes of subsection (a), the term "antitrust laws" has the
meaning given it in subsection (a) of the first section of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12(a)).
SEC. 5. APPLICABILITY.
Section 2(a) of this Act shall not apply to civil actions commenced before the date of
the enactment of this Act.
Id.
132. Report by House Committee on the Judiciary on the Price Fixing Prevention Act of
1989, 438 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1-2 (April 11, 1990) (H.R. 1236 is Congressional response
to acceptance of Chicago School approach to antitrust by Justice Department and by courts).
133. Id. The Department of Justice has not filed a public enforcement action for a violation of the per se rule against vertical price fixing in the last ten years. Id.
134. Id. The bill is designed to negate the additional requirement imposed by the Court
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and reestablish
the rule that vertical agreements to fix prices are prohibited
35

per se.1
The testimony of numerous state attorneys general led the Committee to
conclude that commitment to enforce the per se rule existed on the state
level. 136 In order to remedy this difference in priorities between state and
federal antitrust policies, H.R. 1470 announces the duty of the Justice De-

partment to enforce, at the federal level, the per se illegality of vertical price
fixing. 137 H.R. 1470 seeks to remedy more than just the Monsanto and
Sharp decisions; instead, it attempts to definitively prescribe the standards by
which the courts should judge all vertical restraints which have the effect of
138

fixing prices.
Section 1 of H.R. 1470 simply states that the bill, if enacted into law, shall
be called the "Price Fixing Prevention Act of 199 1., ,139 The substance of the
Act begins in section 2(a) which seeks to restore the evidentiary require-

ments a plaintiff must satisfy to meet the pre-Monsanto standard." 4 As
noted above, Monsanto requires that in vertical price fixing cases, the plainin the Monsanto decision that the plaintiff needs to disprove all possible legitimate purposes for
the agreement in order to prevail. Id.; see also Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764 (addition of require-

ment to negate all possible defenses).
135. Report by House Committee on the Judiciary on the Price Fixing Prevention Act of
1989, 438 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 2 (April 11, 1990) (bill was designed to negate impact of
Sharp). It is the goal of the framers of H.R. 1236 and 1470 to reestablish that not only agreements which explicitly state price but also those agreements which have an affect on price are
illegal per se. Id.
136. Id. at 30 (April 11, 1990) (committee recalled testimony of state attorneys general).
137. Id. at 28-30.
138. Id. at 30 (H.R. 1236 and 1470 seek to establish standards by which all vertical restraints are to be judged).
139. H.R. 1470, 102d Congress, 1st Sess. (1991). Section 1 of the Price Fixing Prevention
Act of 1991 provides that:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE
This Act may be cited as the "Price Fixing Prevention Act of 1991". Id.
Likewise, the Senate version is entitled "The Consumer Protection Against Price-Fixing Act of
1991." See S. 429, 102d Congress, 154 Sess. (1991).
140. H.R. 1470, 102d Congress, 1st Sess. (1991). Section 2(a) of the Price Fixing Prevention Act of 1991 provides that:
SECTION 2. EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS IN FEDERAL CIVIL ANTITRUST
ACTIONS RELATING TO PRICE FIXING.
(a) In any civil action based on a claim arising under section 1 or 3 of the Sherman Act
(15 U.S.C. 1, 3) and alleging a contract combination, or conspiracy to set, change, or
maintain prices (other than a maximum price), evidence that a person who sells a good or
service to the claimant for resale(1) received from a competitor of the claimant a communication regarding price competition by the claimant in the resale of a good or service, and
(2) in response to such communication terminated the claimant as a buyer of a good or
service for resale, or refused to supply to the claimant some or all of such goods or services requested by the claimant, shall be sufficient to raise the inference that such person
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tiff must prove a conspiracy to fix prices, that is, that the manufacturer and
retailer did not act independently and the plaintiff must also refute all possible justifications for the alleged conspiracy. 4 '
If enacted into law, H.R. 1470 (the "Act") overrules the Monsanto decision. 42 According to the Act, the plaintiff will only have to prove, pursuant
to section 1 of the Sherman Act, that: (1) a communication was received by
the supplier from a rival retailer; and (2) the rival retailer was terminated in
response to this communication. 14' The plaintiff will not be precluded from
having the issue presented to the jury simply because evidence exists which
tends to show that the retailer and manufacturer acted independently or that
a reasonable business explanation for the alleged price fixing existed.'" Of
note, section 5 states that section 2(a) will only apply prospectively,
that is,
45
from the date of the enactment of H.R. 1470 into law.'

and such competitor engaged in concerted action to set, or maintain prices for such good
or service in violation of such section ....
Id.

Sections 2 and 3 of S. 429 also seek to return the evidentiary burden placed upon plaintiffs in
vertical price fixing actions to a pre-Monsanto standard. See S. 429, 102d Congress, 1st Sess.
(1991).
141. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 760-64 (1984) (plaintiff
need exclude all possibility of independent action). The Court increased the burden placed
upon plaintiffs in vertical price fixing actions by stating that "something more" need be shown.
Id. at 764. In order to prevail, the plaintiff must show that: (1) (a) the manufacturer received
complaints from a full service retailer about the price cutting retailer; and (b) that the termination was based upon these communications as well as; (2) exclude all possible legal explanations for the conduct. Id.
142. H.R. 1470, 102d Congress, 1st Sess. (1991). Section 2(a) of the Price Fixing Prevention Act of 1991 provides that:
SECTION 2. EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS IN FEDERAL CIVIL ANTITRUST
ACTIONS RELATING TO PRICE FIXING.
(a) ... evidence that a person who sells a good or service to the claimant for resale(1) received from a competitor of the claimant a communication regarding price competition by the claimant in the resale of a good or service, and
(2) in response to such communication terminated the claimant as a buyer of a good or
service for resale, or refused to supply to the claimant some or all of such goods or services requested by the claimant, shall be sufficient to raise the inference that such person
and such competitor engaged in concerted action to set, or maintain prices for such good
or service in violation of such section .... Id.; see also S. 429, 102d Congress, 1st Sess.
(1991) (evidentiary burden returned to pre-Monsanto standard).
143. Id.
144. H.R. 1470, 102d Congress, 1st Sess. (1991). Section 2(a) of the Price Fixing Prevention Act of 1991 provides that the plaintiff need not preclude all possible legal explanations in
order to recover. Id.; see also S. 429, 102d congress, 1st Sess. (1991) (Sections 2 and 3 of S. 429
establish evidentiary burdens comparable to H.R. 1470).
145. Id. Section 5 of the Price Fixing Prevention Act of 1991 provides that:
SEC. 5 APPLICABILITY.
Section 2(a) of this Act shall not apply to civil actions commenced before the date of the
enactment of this Act. Id.
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Congress partially addressed the Sharp decision in section 2(b) of the Act
stating that all minimum vertical price fixing is illegal per se under the Sherman Act.' 4 6 However, Congress specifically exempted maximum vertical
price fixing from the per se illegality standard imposed by the bill. 147 Congress refused to statutorily implement the Kiefer-Stewart decision, which
made maximum price restraints illegal, because it viewed the imposition of
to the economy since
maximum prices by manufacturers as non-detrimental
148

its effect is to hold down prices for the consumer.

146. H.R. 1470, 102d Congress, 1st Sess. (1991). Section 2(b) of the Price Fixing Prevention Act of 1991 counteracts the Sharp decision by providing that:
SECTION 2. EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS IN FEDERAL CIVIL ANTITRUST
ACTIONS RELATING TO PRICE FIXING.
(b) . . . the fact that the seller of a good or service and the purchaser of such good or
service entered into an agreement to set, change, or maintain the price (other than a
maximum price) of such good or service for resale shall be sufficient to constitute a violation of such section. An agreement between the seller of a good or service and the purchaser of such good or service to terminate another purchaser as a dealer or to refuse to
supply such other purchaser because of that purchaser's pricing policies shall constitute a
violation of such section, whether or not a specific price or price level is agreed upon. Id.
147. H.R. 1470, 102d Congress, 1st Sess. (1991); S. 429, 102nd Congress, 1st Sess. (1991).
Section 2(b) of H.R 1470 and S. 429 exempt maximum vertical price fixing from the per se
standard. Id. H.R. 1470 provides that:
SECTION 2. EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS IN FEDERAL CIVIL ANTITRUST
ACTIONS RELATING TO PRICE FIXING.
(b) . . . the fact that the seller of a good or service and the purchaser of such good or
service entered into an agreement to set, change, or maintain the price (other than a
maximum price) of such good or service for resale shall be sufficient to constitute a violation of such section.
Id. This is contrary to prior caselaw which stated that maximum price restraints were just as
inimical as minimum vertical price fixing. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 151-53
(1968) (termination of dealer for charging in excess of maximum price restraint was illegal per
se); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 214 (1951) (agreement
among competitors setting maximum vertical price illegal per se); Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 342 (1982) (agreements to fix a minimum or maximum
price are illegal per se). See generally Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An
Analysis of the Restricted Distribution,HorizontalMerger and PotentialCompetition Decisions,
75 COLUM L. REV. 282, 289-90 (1975) (maximum vertical price restraints are illegal per se).
148. Report by House Committee on the Judiciary on the Price Fixing Prevention Act of
1989, 438 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 30 (April 11, 1990). Congress has stated the proposition
that maximum vertical price fixing schemes are not inimical to competition in that they hold
down prices and are therefore a benefit to the consumer. Id. The Congress fails to recognize
that this is contrary to prior caselaw. Furthermore, various commentators state that the imposition of a maximum price restraint simply acts as a price ceiling which will result in shortages
because manufacturers will stop production when the true market price is above the price they
are allowed to charge. See Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 151-53 (maximum price restraints act as
artificial stimuli to marketplace and are illegal per se); Kiefer-Stewart Co., 340 U.S. at 214
(agreement among competitors setting maximum vertical price is illegal per se since it stifles
competition by reducing output); Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332,
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Section 3 of H.R. 1470 simply reasserts the holding of the Colgate decision. 149 Unilateral action on the part of a manufacturer to implement vertical price restraints is not illegal.15 ° This per se legality focuses on the notion
that the defendant manufacturer should introduce proof which tends to
show that the action of the manufacturer did not impose the vertical rebut simply imposed them as a part of a
straints at the behest of any retailer,
15
unilateral marketing strategy. 1
Finally, Section 4 affirms the application of the Rule of Reason standard
to all non-price vertical restraints152 On June 20, 1990, H.R. 1236, the
predecessor of H.R. 1470, was recommended by the House Judiciary Committee for passage by the full House of Representatives, and on April 18,
1990, the House passed the measure. 1 53 The Senate version of H.R. 1236
was entitled Senate Bill 865.154 However, the Senate version of H.R. 1236

348-51 (1982) (agreements to fix a minimum or maximum price are illegal per se since both act
to interfere with market forces). See generally Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court:
An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282, 289-90 (1975) (maximum vertical price restraints are illegal per
se because they act as price ceilings which interfere with market clearing process).
149. H.R. 1470, 102d Congress, 1st Sess. (1991). Section 3 of the Price Fixing Prevention
Act of 1991 provides that:
SEC. 3. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to change the requirement of the Sherman Act that
a violation of section 1 or 3 of such Act may only be found upon a determination that the
defendant entered into an illegal contract, combination, or conspiracy.
Id.; see also United States v. Colgate Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (bilateral not unilateral
action which affects price is illegal per se).
150. See, e.g., Davis-Watkins Co. v. Service Merchandise, 686 F.2d 1190, 1196-97 (6th
Cir. 1982) (unilateral action not in violation of Sherman Act), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 931
(1984); Sierra Wine Liquor Co. v. Heublein, Inc., 626 F.2d 129, 132-33 (9th Cir. 1980) (termination of a discount retailer based upon unilateral decision not illegal); Quality Mercury, Inc.
v. Ford Motor Co., 542 F.2d 466, 469 (8th Cir. 1976) (if refusal to deal unilateral no violation
of Sherman Act has occurred but if more than unilateral action such is illegal combination),
cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977).
151. See Colgate Co., 250 U.S. at 307 (legality of price oriented vertical restraint depends
upon introduction of evidence to demonstrate mere unilateral action).
152. H.R. 1470, 102d Congress, 1st Sess. (1991). Section 4 of the Price Fixing Prevention
Act of 1991 provided that:
SEC. 4. RULE OF REASON STANDARD
(a) IN GENERAL-Nothing in this Act shall affect the application of the rule-of-reason
standard to vertical location clauses or vertical territorial restraints under the antitrust
laws.
(b) DEFINITION.-For purposes of subsection (a), the term "antitrust laws" has the
meaning given it in subsection (a) of the first section of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 12(a)).

Id.
153. See 136 Cong. Rec. H. 1518 (April 18, 1990) (H.R. 1236 passes House of
Representatives).
154. S. 429, 102d Congress, 1st Sess. (1991). Senate Bill 429 provides that:
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was not approved during the 101st, Congress thus prompting both houses of

SEC. 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as "The Consumer
Protection Against Price-Fixing Act of 1991".
SEC. 2. The Congress Finds that(1) consumer welfare is greatly enhanced by an ability to purchase goods and services at
lower prices as a result of vigorous price competition;
(2) vertical price restraints generally have an adverse impact on competition that results
in higher consumer prices;
(3) recent court decisions have so narrowly construed the laws against vertical price restraints that consumer welfare has been put in jeopardy; and
(4) it is necessary to enact legislation that protects the interests of consumers in vigorous
price competition while recognizing the needs of manufacturers and others to maintain
reasonable service, quality, and safety standards.
SEC. 3. THE SHERMAN ACT IS AMENDED BY REDESIGNATING SECTION 8
AND ANY REFERENCES TO SECTION 8 AS SECTION 9 AND BY INSERTING
BETWEEN SECTION 7 AND SECTION 9, AS HEREIN REDESIGNATED, THE
FOLLOWING NEW SECTION:
SEC. 8. (a)(l)(A). In any civil action based on section 1 or 3 of this Act, including an
action brought by the United States or by a State attorney general, or by the Federal
Trade Commission Act, which alleges a contract, combination or conspiracy to set,
change, or maintain prices, if pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the court
finds that there is sufficient evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a trier of fact
could reasonably conclude that a person who sells a good or service to the claimant for
resale entered into a contract, combination, or conspiracy with a competitor of such
claimant to curtail or eliminate price competition by such claimant in the resale of such
good or service, then the court shall permit the trier of fact to consider whether such
person and such competitor is engaged in concerted action to set, change, or maintain
prices for such good or service in violation of such section.
(B) For purposes of paragraph (1), the court shall find the existence of 'sufficient evidence' that a person who sells a good or service entered into a contract, combination, or
conspiracy if the claimant presents evidence that such person(i) received from a competitor of the claimant an express or impled request or demand,
including threat to discontinue an existing business arrangement, that the seller takes
steps to curtail or eliminate price competition by the claimant in the resale of such good
or service, and
(ii) because of such request, demand, or threat terminated the claimant as buyer of such
good or service for resale or refused to supply to the claimant some or all of such goods or
services requested by the claimant: Provided, that a termination or refusal to supply is
made because of such request, demand, or threat only if such request, demand or threat is
the major contributing cause of such termination or refusal to supply.
(2) The court shall not permit the trier of fact to consider whether such person and such
competitor engaged in concerted action to set, change, or maintain prices for such good or
service in violation of such section if the court determines that the trier of fact could only
find that such person and such competitor engaged in concerted action by making inferences which are implausible.
(b) In any civil action based on section 1 or 3 of this Act, including an action brought
by the Federal Trade Commission under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
which alleges a contract, combination, or conspiracy to set, change or maintain prices, the
fact that the seller of a good or service and the purchaser of a good or service entered into
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the 102nd Congress to reintroduce H.R. 1236 as H.R. 1470 in the House of
Representatives and S. 865 as S. 429 in the Senate.1 55 In its most recent
action, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported S. 429 to the full Senate
without recommendation on March 21, 1991.156 If approved by both
Houses of Congress, a joint committee will harmonize S. 429 and H.R. 1470
and then send the bill on to President Bush for enactment into law.

IX. A SHARP SOLUTION
Aside from the academic debate between the Harvard and Chicago
Schools over the propriety of the per se illegality of vertical price fixing, the
Monsanto and Sharp decisions represent the more fundamental issue of the

separation of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial branches
of government. While some overlap of authority is inevitable between the
three branches of government, the unprecedented campaign by the Department of Justice to overturn the per se rule of illegality, first enunciated in Dr.

Miles over eighty years ago, cannot be justified under any authority of the
executive branch." 7 The blatant attempt by the Justice Department to supersede the authority of the Legislature contravenes the principle of separa-

an agreement to set, change, or maintain the resale price of a good or service shall be
sufficient to constitute a violation of such section, except that this section shall not apply
when the agreement to set, change, or maintain the resale price of a good or service is an
agreement to set, change, or maintain the maximum resale price of a good or service. An
agreement between the seller of a good or service and the purchaser of a good or service to
terminate another purchaser as a dealer or to refuse to supply such other purchaser because of that purchaser's pricing policies shall constitute a violation of this section,
whether or not a specific price or price level is agreed upon.
SEC. 4 NOTHING IN THIS ACT SHALL BE CONSTRUED TO CHANGE THE
REQUIREMENT OF THE SHERMAN ACT THAT A VIOLATION OF SECTION 1
OR 3 OF THAT ACT MAY NOT BE FOUND UPON A DETERMINATION THAT
THE DEFENDANT ENTERED INTO AN ILLEGAL CONTRACT, COMBINATION, OR CONSPIRACY.
SEC. 5 NOTHING IN THIS ACT SHALL AFFECT THE APPLICATION OF THE
RULE OF REASON STANDARD TO VERTICAL LOCATION CLAUSES OR VERTICAL TERRITORIAL RESTRAINTS UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAWS. Id.
155. See 136 CONG. REC. 1409 (Feb. 22, 1990) (S. 865 approved by Senate Judiciary
Committee). Senate Bill 865 was reintroduced in the 102d Congress on February 22, 1991 as
Senate Bill 429. See S. 429, 102d Congress, 1st Sess. (1991). H.R. 1236 was likewise reintroduced in the 102d Congress on March 19, 1991 as H.R. 1470. See H.R. 1470, 102d Congress,
1st Sess. (1991).
156. See 137 Cong. Rec. D. 357 (March 21, 1991) (S. 429 ordered reported without recommendation by Senate Judiciary Committee).
157. See O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530 (1933) (separation of powers to
prevent both concentration of power and overlap between branches); Springer v. Philippine
Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 201 (1927) (separation of powers basic and essential to American constitutional government).
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tion of powers among the three branches of government."5 8 Congress ought
to temper this struggle by enacting the Vertical Restraints Guideline Resolution which, through the use of the "power of the purse," effectively prevents
the Justice Department from urging the courts to abandon the per se illegality of vertical price fixing.I5 9 This measure, however, has proved fruitless in
the past because the theories of the Chicago School had already been embraced by the Supreme Court.' 6°
Through the Price Fixing Prevention Act, Congress is seeking to find a
simple solution to the Monsanto-Sharp dilemma by asserting its supremacy
as the "ultimate antitrust policy-maker."' ''6 As such, Congress intends to

158. See Report by House Committee on the Judiciary on the Price Fixing Prevention
Act of 1989, 438 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 25-29 (April 11, 1990). Section 1 of the Sherman

Antitrust Act provides that: "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is hereby declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1973). This language has been interpreted to mean that all agreements which affect price are illegal per se. See Broadcast Music,
Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979) (per se rule applies to restraints
which stifle competition); National Soc'y of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S.
679, 688 (1978) (restraints which have anticompetitive impact on trade illegal per se); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1977) (restraints with market
impact on price illegal per se); United States v. General Motors, 384 U.S. 127, 147 (1966)
(attempts to eliminate discount retailers in order to protect franchise dealers has indirect affect
on price and illegal per se); United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 298
(1945)-(price fixing illegal under Sherman Act even though affects only local prices); United
States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 276 (1942) (fixing prices pursuant to an express delegation, acquiescence or an understanding is illegal per se); Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC,
312 U.S. 457, 466 (1941) (vertical price fixing tends to create monopolies and lessen competition and is illegal); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil. Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) (vertical price fixing is illegal per se); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 396
(1927) (price fixing is illegal per se and no excuses of reasonableness of price will be entertained); FTC v. Pacific States Paper Trade Ass'n, 273 U.S. 52, 62 (1927) (express or tacit
agreement on price illegal); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, Co., 220 U.S. 373,
399-402 (1911) (agreements or combinations between dealers which have purpose of destruction of competition illegal per se). Contra Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics
Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723-36 (1988) (vertical restraints not illegal per se absent express agreement on prices).
159. Vertical Restraints Guidlines Resolution, Pub. L. No. 99-180, § 605, 1985 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (99 Stat.) 1169 ("Vertical Restraints Guideline Resolution"
forbade use of public funds to urge abandonment of vertical restraints case precedent).
160. Vertical Restraints Guidelines Resolution, Pub. L. No. 99-180, 1985 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (99 Stat.) 1169 (disavowing validity of Justice Department's "Vertical Restraint Guidelines").
161. See Jefferson County Pharm. Ass'n v. Abbott Labs, 460 U.S. 150, 170 (1983) (quoting in part United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 606 (1941)) (Congress is ultimate
antitrust policy-maker). In commenting on the controversy over the propriety of previous
antitrust legislation, the Court stated that: " '[a]lthough Congress is well aware of these criticisms ... it certainly is not for this Court to indulge in the business of policy-making in the
field of antitrust legislation.' Our function ends with the endeavor to ascertain from the words
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reorder fundamental antitrust policies such as the evidentiary burden placed
upon plaintiffs in vertical price fixing litigation and the standard by which to
judge the illegality of vertical price agreements. 162 Such measures should
ultimately meet with success since the Supreme Court has historically deferred to the legislative branch on antitrust matters governed by specific statutory authority.163 The approach of deferring to the stated goals of the
written law has been a prominent approach of the Rehnquist Court. Thus,
to properly counter the Monsanto and Sharp decisions and reassert its status
as the "ultimate antitrust policy-maker," Congress should quickly and decisively enact the Price Fixing Prevention Act of 1991.
While H.R. 1470(2)(a) clearly reverses the effects of the Monsanto decision by reinstating the pre-Monsanto evidentiary burden, H.R. 1470(2)(b)
does not effectively repair the dichotomy created by the Sharp decision between vertical price fixing agreements which affect price but do not directly
state price, and those vertical price fixing agreements which explicitly set
prices.
The pre-Sharp standard was clear-agreements which explicitly
used, construed in the light of the relevant material, what is in fact the intent of Congress." Id.
This deference by the judiciary to the legislative branch in the field of antitrust policy has come
under attack by the Chicago School. See generally Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the
Classroom and the Courtroom, 50 U. CHi. L. REV. 800, 818 (1983) (Congressional intent subservient to common law). Judge Posner stated that: "[i]f the legislature enacts into statutory
law a common law concept, as Congress did when it forbade agreements in 'restraints of trade'
in the Sherman Act, that is a clue that the courts are to interpret the statute with the freedom
with which they interpret a common law principle-in which event the values of the framers
may not be controlling at all." Id.
162. Id.; Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 735-36
(1988) (Court alters absolute rule of per se illegality of agreements which affect price by stating
that vertical restraints not illegal per se absent express agreement on prices); Monsanto Co. v.
Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984) (Court alters evidentiary standard by stating
that plaintiff need disprove all justifications which would legitimize agreement).
163. See United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 606 (1941) (Court acknowledged
that it is not antitrust policymaker and stated its duty was only to construe intent of Congress).
164. H.R. 1470, 102d Congress, 1st Sess. (1991). The Price Fixing Prevention Act of
1991 does not include agreements which affect price; it provides that:
SECTION 2. EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS IN FEDERAL CIVIL ANTITRUST
ACTIONS RELATING TO PRICE FIXING.
(b) ... a contract, combination, or conspiracy to set, change, or maintain prices.., shall
be sufficient to constitute a violation of such section. An agreement between the seller of a
good or service and the purchaser of such good or service to terminate another purchaser
as a dealer or to refuse to supply such other purchaser because of that purchaser's pricing
policies shall constitute a violation of such section, whether or not a specific price or price
level is agreed upon.
Id. Likewise, the Senate Bill, S. 429, does not effectively counteract the Sharp and Monsanto
decisions because only agreements which directly state price are deemed illegal per se. S. 429,
102d Congress, 1st Sess. (1991). While the pending bill does not expressly state that agreements which do not explicitly state price are illegal per se, prior case precedent makes clear
that such agreements are illegal per se. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S.
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or implicitly fixed vertical prices were deemed illegal per se. 16 However,
Congress could easily remedy this dichotomy. Congress should rewrite
H.R. 1470(2)(b) to state that in addition to vertical agreements which explicitly prescribe price, all agreements by participants in the vertical chain of
distribution which directly affect price, are illegal per se. Such language
would eliminate the distinction created by the Sharp decision and close the
loophole which currently exists in the language of H.R. 1470(2)(b).
X.

CONCLUSION

To effectively counteract the demise of the per se rule, Congress should
implement a fourfold program. First, Congress should continue to impose
the Vertical Restraints Guideline Resolution to prevent the Justice Department from seeking the help of the judiciary to overrule further antitrust case
precedent. Second, the language of H.R. 1470(2)(a) needs to be adopted into
law in order to reverse the effects of the Monsanto decision and reaffirm that
a plaintiff in vertical price fixing litigation need only show that the manufacturer received complaints from a competing retailer and that the plaintiff
was terminated as a result. Third, Congress must delete the provision in
H.R. 1470 which exempts maximum price fixing agreements from the scope
of the per se illegality and thus leave the Kiefer-Stewart decision intact. Finally, Congress must amend the language of H.R. 1470(2)(b) to reflect the
rule that vertical price fixing, whether it explicitly states price or has the
effect of fixing a price, is illegal per se under the Sherman Antitrust Act as an
illegal contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade. Only if all
of these measures are enacted into law can Congress reestablish its role as
the "ultimate antitrust policymaker."

127, 147 (1966) (attempts to eliminate discount retailers in order to protect franchise dealers
has indirect affect on price and is illegal per se); United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc.,
324 U.S. 293, 296 (1945) (price fixing illegal under Sherman Act even if it only affect prices but
does not explicitly state them).
165. See National Soc'y of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688
(1978) (restraints which have anticompetitive impact on trade are illegal per se); see also
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979) (per se rule
applies to restraints which stifle competition); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
433 U.S. 36, 49-51 51 (1977) (restraints with market impact on price are illegal per se); United
States v. General Motors, 384 U.S. 127, 147 (1966) (attempts to eliminate discount retailers in
order to protect franchise dealers has indirect affect on price and is illegal per se); United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) rehearing denied 310 U.S. 658
(1940) (vertical price fixing illegal per se); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392,
396 (1926) (vertical price fixing illegal per se and reasonableness of price is no excuse); FTC v.
Pacific States Paper Trade Ass'n, 273 U.S. 52, 62 (1926) (express or tacit agreement on price is
illegal); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, Co., 220 U.S. 373, 399-402 (1911)
(agreements or combinations between dealers which have purpose of destruction of competition are illegal per se).
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